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Project Evaluation and Uncertainty in Practice:
A Statistical Analysis of Rate-of-Return
Divergences of 1,015 World Bank Projects
Gerhard Pohl and Dubravko Mihaljek
This article analyzes the World Bank's experience with project evaluation for a sample
of 1,015 projects by comparing estimated rates of return at appraisal with reestimated
rates of return when construction works are completed, usually S to 10 years after
appraisal. The analysis highlights the high degree of uncertainty in project analysis. A
wide range of variables has been introduced to explain the observed divergence in
appraisal and reestimated rates of return, but only a relatively small part of the diver-
gence can be explained, even with the benefit of hindsight. Project analysis thus has to
cope with a large degree of uncertainty, which the traditional methods of project
evaluation and selection have not been able to reduce.
The World Bank's long history of project financing provides a unique oppor-
tunity to quantify the level of uncertainty in public sector investment projects in
developing countries and to assess the effects of cost-benefit analysis on invest-
ment decisions. For projects whose costs and benefits are reasonably amenable
to quantification, Bank staff calculate economic rates of return at appraisal and
again at project completion (after construction works have been completed and
the project begins normal operations). For more than 1,000 projects, economic
rate of return estimates now are available for both appraisal and completion.
The difference between these two estimates provides an interesting empirical
measure of the uncertainty of development projects financed by the World Bank.
Cost-benefit analysis is a standard appraisal tool for selecting development
projects at the World Bank and other development finance institutions. Several
governments also have adopted these techniques in planning public investment
projects. The World Bank broadly follows the Little-Mirrlees (1968, 1974)
methodology, which expanded earlier approaches to cost-benefit analysis to take
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account of economic distortions typically prevailing in developing countries.
Squire and van der Tak (1975) refined the methodology further to take account
of income distribution effects, as did Reutlinger (1970) to take account of uncer-
tainty. More recent generalizations and refinements of the theory of cost-benefit
analysis are reviewed, for example, in Dreze and Stern (1987) and Squire
(1989).
The theory of cost-benefit analysis provides a rigorous conceptual framework
in which to evaluate public expenditure programs and investment projects (Little
and Mirrlees 1991). Practical applications, however, depart quite substantially
from these ideals because some of the key parameters are difficult to estimate in
practice. In theory, for example, net discounted benefits at the accounting rate of
interest would be the appropriate criterion to decide whether to carry out a
particular project in the Little-Mirrlees framework. In practice it is quite difficult
to estimate the accounting rate of interest reasonably accurately. Equating the
accounting rate of interest with the (highest) rate that just exhausts available
investment funds, as suggested early on by Little and Mirrlees, is conceptually
clear and simple, but few, if any, developing countries have a comprehensive
ranking of available public investment opportunities. Returns on past public
sector investments may be misleading due to poor investment decisions or inap-
propriate economic policies. Project proposals by sectoral agencies, however,
may be padded with optimistic assumptions and imply an exaggerated rate of
return.
Since public sector and economywide rate-of-return estimates vary considera-
bly across countries (depending on endowments and, more important, on poli-
cies), the Bank uses the internal rate of return calculated at shadow prices or, for
short, the economic rate of return as an important, but not exclusive, decision
criterion. With few exceptions the World Bank finances only projects that have
an estimated economic rate of return of at least 10 percent at appraisal (in
constant prices).
Of course projects financed by the World Bank are not necessarily representa-
tive of public sector investments in developing countries. Projects submitted by
governments for Bank financing may primarily include projects with above-
average rates of return and below-average risks. This may be particularly true in
large countries (such as India), where Bank-financed projects represent only a
very small part of the public investment program.
Although a considerable degree of uncertainty is to be expected in implement-
ing development projects, the extent of revealed uncertainty in World Bank
projects is striking. Estimates of economic rates of return at appraisal (AERR) are
relatively poor predictors of reestimated rates of return at completion of con-
struction works (RERR). Figure 1, in which each point represents rates of return
for one project, shows this relation—most of the points in the figure are below
the 45 degree line, that is, most projects have economic rates of return lower at
completion than at appraisal.
The reestimated rates of return are not true ex-post rates of return because
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Figure 1. Relation between Appraisal and Reestimated Rates of Return
Reestimated rate of return
10 20
Appraisal rate of return
Note: Projects with appraisal or reestimated economic rates of return greater than 40 percent
(about 8 percent of all projects) have been omitted for greater clarity.
Source: Authors' calculations.
they are made at the start-up of normal operations. In view of the long life of
most investment projects, ex-post estimates can be made only after 10 or more
years. However, when the reestimated rates are calculated, the effect of a num-
ber of risks already is known (such as investment costs, construction delays, and
initial operating performance), and later costs and benefits are more heavily
discounted. Because of the long life of most investment projects, the relation
between ex-post rates of return and reestimated rates at completion of construc-
tion may be as loose as the relation between appraisal and reestimated rates of
return.
This article analyzes the differences between appraisal and reestimated rates
of return with statistical techniques and provides some initial interpretation of
the results. The statistical analysis can capture only faaors that are measurable
and are applicable to all types of projects. This approach can provide only an
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overview and cannot substitute for project performance audits at the project
level. The rate of return of a copper project, for example, will depend strongly
on whether actual copper price developments fulfill appraisal expeaations. The
closest our analysis gets to this is through inclusion of a composite real commod-
ity price index on projects in broad sectors (for example, agriculture).
As discussed in the next two sections, the nature of our data set poses several
challenges for statistical analysis. Two most serious ones are the hetero-
skedasticiry of residuals and the censoring of reestimated rates of return. To
avoid these problems, we have transformed the dependent and explanatory
variables in such a way that the error term is constant, and we have used the
maximum likelihood estimation technique within the Tobit regression frame-
work. Tests performed confirm the validity of this approach and therefore give
additional weight to our results.
I. THE DATA
This analysis is based largely on a data base maintained by the Bank's Opera-
tions Evaluation Department (OED), an independent unit reporting directly to
the Executive Directors. The complete data set includes 2,200 projects for
which project completion reports had been issued during 1974-87 by the respec-
tive project departments for audit by the OED on a sample basis. For slightly
more than half of these projects, economic rates of return have been calculated
by the staff at appraisal and project completion (start-up of normal operations).
For the remainder of the projects in the data base (such as technical assistance
and structural adjustment loans), economic rates of return were not available,
primarily because quantification was deemed infeasible or unjustified. A few
projects were excluded because other key variables were missing from the data
set, or because other supplementary data were not available. The analysis thus
was carried out with a final sample of 1,015 projects for which a complete data
set was available. The sample selection is fairly objective and does not appear to
bias the results. The only systematic omission is financial intermediation proj-
ects, which finance numerous small- and medium-scale industrial and agri-
cultural projects. A similar analysis could, in principle, be carried out for finan-
cial intermediation projects, but would involve considerable effort to collect
data.
The OED data base was augmented by supplementary variables that were
believed to be important explanatory factors of project success, including the
Bank's internal ranking of economic management performance by country as of
1978, a country-specific index of price distortions for the 1970s (Agarwala
1983), real commodity price movements, per capita income, and adult literacy
rates. The price distortion index was available for 31 countries accounting for
612 projects. A separate analysis was undertaken for this smaller sample. Sec-
toral and regional dummy variables were introduced as proxies for project
characteristics and management performance.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics for 1,015 World Bank Projects
Economic rate of return (percent)
At appraisal
At projea completion
Total project cost
(US dollar millions, current prices)
At appraisal
At projea completion
Nominal cost overrun (percent)
Unexpected inflation (percent)
Real cost overrun (percent)
Time overrun (years)
Time overrun (percent)
Mean
22
16
86
102
22
20
- 6
2
58
Median
18
14
34
40
10
23
- 1 1
2
46
Maximum
158
128
3,193
4,045
514
38
394
16
405
Minimum
1
- 2 0
1
1
- 8 9
- 2
- 9 1
- 4
-68
Standard
deviation
13
13
185
233
46
7
34
2
56
Note: Project completion refers to start-up of normal operations.
Source: Authors' calculations.
Table 1 presents the main descriptive statistics for the data set and shows the
wide variety of projects. Economic rates of return are derived, as explained
above, as real internal rates of return at economic (shadow) prices. Project costs
in the data base are in nominal U.S. dollars and range from about $1 million to
more than $4 billion. Forty percent of the projects are in agriculture, 30 percent
in transport, 20 percent in energy, and the rest in industry and urban develop-
ment. The larger part of the Bank's industrial lending is intermediated through
financial institutions. Unfortunately, average rates of return on financial inter-
mediation lending are not systematically available.
Except for construction costs, the medians are fairly close to the averages for
the data set. Constant-dollar cost data are not recorded in the data base, al-
though they are available in the projea files and have been used to calculate the
economic rates of return. Rather than sifting through 1,015 voluminous project
files, we have estimated implicit real costs from forecast and actual price devel-
opments as well as from other implementation data in the data base (see the
appendix).
There is considerable variation in the appraisal rates of return, ranging from
only 1 percent for a water supply project in Bombay to 158 percent for a seed
projea in India (which had a reestimated rate of return at projea completion of
only 11 percent). The wide range of rates of return both at appraisal and projea
completion ( -20 to 128 percent) is perhaps surprising. In the more orderly
world of economic theory and model-building, one usually assumes that rates of
return converge within a fairly narrow range. Ninety percent of all projeas have
appraisal rates of return in the range of 10-40 percent, but only about half have
reestimated rates of return within this range, which highlights the importance of
uncertainty. The average rate of return of World Bank projeas has behaved in a
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more orderly way, averaging 22 percent at appraisal and 16 percent at project
completion, with fairly small differences from year to year.
For about 5 percent of all projects the reestimated (internal) rates of return are
negative. For many projects with negative rates of return these are given as —5
percent in the data base, presumably because negative internal rates are highly
sensitive to small differences in assumptions and to truncation of the time hori-
zon. The economic interpretation of negative internal rates of return in most
cases is a zero rate of return (no increase in output for some large investment).
Only if variable costs exceeded benefits (both at shadow prices) would one
normally speak of "negative" rates of return, which typically would be due to
domestic price distortions (negative value added at international prices).
Although the average reestimated rates of return are satisfactory (16 percent,
versus 22 percent at appraisal), there are many projects with low returns (25
percent of all projects have reestimated rates of return below 10 percent, 14
percent have below 5 percent, and 8 percent of all projects have zero or negative
rates of return). This suggests that considerable benefits could be obtained if the
factors that lead to project failure could be identified. Defining project failure is
not a simple matter. Some cutoff point for rates of return has to be adopted to
distinguish successful from unsuccessful projects. In the Little-Mirrlees frame-
work, that cutoff point would be relatively high (say 10 percent) due to the
choice of the numeraire ("uncommitted public income " as opposed to consump-
tion in the UNIDO methodology; see Dasgupta, Marglin, and Sen 1972 and Ray
1984).
World Bank projects have, on average, taken considerably more time to im-
plement (six years) than expected at appraisal (four years), and project costs in
U.S. dollars were, on average, 22 percent higher than estimated at appraisal,
despite ample physical and price contingencies built into project cost estimates.
Project cost overruns and implementation delays thus could be important factors
in explaining project performance and the loose relationship between rate-of-
return estimates at appraisal and project completion.
With the help of the derived real project costs, the reported nominal cost
overruns were decomposed into two parts: unexpected changes in the general
price level for capital goods and project-specific real cost increases. The latter
could be due to an error in project cost estimates, unforeseen difficulties and
expenditures, or increases in the scope of projects. Nominal cost overruns
mostly are explained by unexpectedly high inflation during the period (primarily
the 1970s), with actual prices being 20 percent higher than projected at ap-
praisal. Perhaps surprisingly, the appraisal cost estimates were, on average, too
high in real terms. Nominal cost overruns thus are primarily due to unexpec-
tedly high inflation. Real cost variations range from - 9 0 percent (probably
largely due to cancellations of project components) to increases of nearly 400
percent (probably reflecting expansion in the scope of projects, rather than
faulty cost calculations).
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II. STATISTICAL METHODOLOGY
The divergence between the appraisal and reestimated rates of return has been
analyzed with two types of linear regression; the results from both types of
regression are reported in section HI. The first consists of regressing the reesti-
mated rates of return at project completion on the appraisal rates of return and
several other factors that are thought to influence project performance. Since
both the appraisal and reestimated rates of return depend on the same set of
other factors, this approach is best interpreted in terms of a "seemingly unrelated
regression" model. (See Zellner [1962] for the original contribution; and Wal-
lace, Duane, and Nawaz [1987] for an application similar to this article.)
One statistical problem with the standard ordinary least squares (OLS) estima-
tion of this linear regression model is that residuals calculated from the above
data set do not have uniform variance and zero correlation with one another. In
the presence of heteroskedasticity the OLS estimator remains unbiased, but it no
longer has minimum variance among all linear unbiased estimators. Also the
usual formula for the variance-covariance matrix of OLS estimators is incorrect,
and therefore the usual estimator of their variance is biased, implying that
interval estimation and hypothesis testing using these estimators no longer can
be trusted. Intuitively, one would expect larger time and cost overruns to be
associated with larger discrepancies in the rates of return. For a wide range of
projects the standard deviation of reestimated rates of return increases only
moderately with appraisal rates of return (from 9 percentage points for projects
with AERRS of 10-20 percent to 14 percentage points for projects with AERRS of
30—40 percent), but it jumps to 25 percentage points for a small number of
projects with higher AERRS.
Several techniques exist to correct the standard errors of estimates (White
1980). We eliminate the problem by transforming the variables in such a way
that the error term is constant. Thus in the second type of regression model the
dependent variable is the percentage change in the reestimated rate over the
appraisal rate of return [(RERR — AERR)/AERR]. This transformation eliminates
heteroskedasricity, but at the cost of losing interesting information about the
relation between the appraisal and reestimated rates of return. A third approach
(not undertaken here) would be to eliminate projects with very high appraisal
rates of return, because these may have an extraordinarily strong influence over
the results. High AERRS often are due to major changes in expectations and
usually involve comparatively small investments (for example, energy conserva-
tion, resource discoveries, and technological breakthroughs).
Besides heteroskedasticity, the nature of our data set gives rise to another
statistical problem: censoring of reestimated rates of return. From table 1 it
appears that the range of variation of reestimated rates of return is wide enough
to make plausible the assumption of an approximately normal distribution of
residuals. However, there is a considerable piling up (about 7 percent of proj-
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ects) of RERRS at a cutoff point of - 5 percent. This reflects the established
practice in the World Bank whereby a project deemed to be a complete failure
usually is assigned a —5 percent rate of return at completion.1
From an econometric point of view, the presence of the cutoff point implies
that we are dealing with a censored sample, as some observations of the RERR
that correspond to known values of time and cost overruns are not observable,
being instead arbitrarily assigned the RERR of - 5 percent. The difficulty with
OLS estimation based on censored data samples is that the least squares estima-
tors of regression parameters are biased and inconsistent, using either the entire
sample or the subsample of complete observations. (For analysis of censored
data samples see, for example, Maddala [1983] or Judge and others [1985].)
These kind of data are best analyzed within the framework of the censored
regression model, also known as the Tobit model (Tobin 1958). A number of
techniques now exist to estimate Tobit models (see Amemiya 1984). To generate
more efficient parameter estimates, we used the maximum likelihood technique,
which yields estimators with several desirable asymptotic properties (see, for
example, Greene 1990).
The Tobit regression model for our data sample is of the form:
( 1 )
 " [0 otherwise
and the corresponding regression function is given by:
(2) E(y,-1 x,., >,->*) = X / 0 + ae,-
where y is a vector of dependent variables (RERRS or percentage changes thereof
over the AERRS), X is a matrix of explanatory variables, /3 is a vector of un-
known regression parameters, a is an unknown scale parameter, e and e are
vectors of errors assumed to come from the standard normal distribution, k
is the cutoff point ( - 5 percent for regressions where RERR is the dependent
variable and —1 for regressions where the dependent variable is (RERR -
AERR)/AERR)), and 5 observations out of T are unobservable.2
1. Another such practice is that projects with appraisal rates of return of less than 10 percent usually
are not considered for approval. Theoretically, in the presence of this cutoff point the data set would be
truncated: values of time and cost overruns and RERRS would be known only when AERRS at or above 10
percent were observed, so we could make no inference on the potential performance of projects that were
not accepted for financing. However, in the data set there are 46 projects (4.5 percent of the total) that
were approved even though they had AERJU of less than 10 percent, so information on normally "unob-
servable" projects actually is not missing.
2. The log likelihood function for this regression model is given by:
l n L - - ( V Z H l n ^ J + i n * 2 ] - (\ll»1)Zx{yi-&'x,P + E > [ 1 - * W x,/ff)]
where *<•) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. The first two parts of this function
correspond to the classical regression for noncensored observations; the last part corresponds to the
relevant probabilities for the censored observations (see Amemiya 1973). MLE estimates of diis regression
model were computed using the UFER£G procedure of the SAS statistical package, version 6.06.
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III. THE MODELS AND ESTIMATION RESULTS
In the simplest model the reestimated economic rate of return is the dependent
variable, and the appraisal economic rate of return is the explanatory variable.
Additional models are presented with explanatory variables for cost overruns,
implementation delays, and unexpected inflation. These explanatory variables
are also used in alternative models with a transformed dependent variable. Two
of the initial five models are estimated with additional explanatory variables to
account for changes in primary commodity prices, economic management fac-
tors, and sectoral and geographic differences.
Five Initial Modeb
The simplest possible model relates only appraisal and reestimated rates of
return and assumes that no other factors have been identified. Thus equation 3
represents model 1:
(3) RERR = a + b AERR + OU.
Models 2 and 3 expand on model 1 to include project cost overruns and imple-
mentation delays, which are intuitively linked with poor project performance.
Model 2 introduces two variables from the data base: the nominal cost overrun
and the rime overrun, both in percent. Model 3 introduces two variables that
decompose the nominal cost overrun into two components: unexpected inflation
and real cost overruns.
Equation 4 gives the format for regressions with the transformed dependent
variable (RERR — AERR)/AERR and the transformed explanatory variables (X, —
(4) (RERR - AERR)/AERR = a + b' [(X, - X ^ J / X , ^ ] + au
where t denotes the relevant observation at the time of completion (of construc-
tion) and t — 1 the appraisal estimate of that same variable.
Maximum likelihood parameter estimates for models 1 through 5 are given in
table 2, with summary statistics obtained from the OLS estimates of the regres-
sions. Normal scale parameter a does not have an intuitive economic interpreta-
tion, so its estimates are not reported. In all regressions where the dependent
variable is RERR, the estimates of a are on the order of about 12 percentage
points and are statistically highly significant.
Model 1. The results for model 1 indicate that economic rates of return
reestimated at project completion are, on average, considerably lower than
appraisal estimates (b = 0.44). The intercept is quite large (5.88 percentage
points), indicating that reestimated rates of return are somewhat higher, relative
to appraisal estimates, for projects with low appraisal rates of return. A project
with an appraisal rate of return of 10 percent has a reestimated rate of return
approximately equal to its appraisal rate of return (5.88 + 0.44 x 10), whereas
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Table 2. Maximum Likelihood Estimates for the Initial Five Models
Explanatory variables •
and regression statistics
Explanatory variable
Intercept
Appraisal rate of return
Nominal cost overrun
Time overrun
Unexpected inflation
Real cost overrun
Regression statistics (OLS)
Adjusted R2
F-statistic
Chi-square statistic
(critical value for
1 percent level)
F-test of the regression
Dependent variable
Reestimated economic rate
Model 1
5-88
(0.76)
0.44
(0.03)
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
0.19
240
13.lb
(9.2)
n.a.
of return
Model 2
5.25
(0.88)
0.44
(0.03)
0.003
(0.009)-
0.009
(0.007)*
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
0.19
80
26.8b
(21.7)
0.7
Model 3
8.78
(1.26)
0.45
(0.03)
n.a.
n.a.
0.012
(0.007)
0.23
(0.06)
0.01
(0.01)»
0.20
64.6
40.8b
(29.1)
5.0c
Change in reestimated
economic rate of return
relative to the appraisal
economic rate of return
Model 4
-101.42
(7.89)
n.a.
n.a.
0.07
(O.uy
0.01
{O.oiy
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
0.0012
0.59
9.38
(15.1)
n.a.
Models
-40 .76
(12.72)
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
0.03
(0.08)"
3.63
(0.70)
0.14
(0.14)-
0.032
11.029
17.4
(21.7)
28.8<»
n.a. Not applicable.
Note: Sample size is 1,015 for all five models. Values in parentheses are the standard errors.
a. Not significant ac the 5 percent level.
b. Presence of heteroskedasticity at the 1 percent level of significance.
c. Regression fit improved with respect to model 1.
d. Regression fit improved with respect to model 4.
Source: Authors' calculations.
a project with an appraisal rate of return of 30 percent has, on average, a
reestimated rate of return of 19 percent (5.88 + 0.44 x 30). As indicated by the
low values of standard errors of estimates, both the intercept and the parameter
estimate for AERR are statistically highly significant. However, the appraisal rate
of return explains only 19 percent of the variance, which indicates a rather loose
relation between rate of return estimates at appraisal and completion of con-
struction, already shown in figure 1.
Model 2. In model 2 parameter estimates for nominal cost overrun and time
overrun are small and statistically insignificant, thus indicating that nominal
cost overruns and implementation delays do not seem to be major factors in
explaining divergences in the rates of return.
Model 3. In model 3 the real cost overrun parameter remains low and statis-
tically insignificant, while the unexpected inflation variable is statistically signif-
icant. Since unexpected price increases have been expressed as negative numbers
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(reduction in the real value of available project resources), the parameter esti-
mate implies that for projects with (the average) unexpected increase in the price
level of 20 percent, rates of return have been reduced by 4.6 percentage points.
The results seem to suggest that real increases in project cost have had no
systematic effect on rates of return of World Bank projects. Unexpected infla-
tionary pressures have adversely affected the performance of Bank projects,
perhaps because of relative price changes between capital-good inputs and proj-
ect outputs.
Regression of model 3 also yields a statistically significant estimate of the time
overrun variable, which, surprisingly, has the wrong sign. If, for example, it
takes an average project 58 percent more time to be completed than forecasted
at appraisal, one can expect that this would improve the RERR by about 0.7
percentage points. According to this result, the systematic bias toward under-
estimating the time needed for project completion may be based on the wrong
intuitive assumption that long periods of implementation are bad for project
performance. However, the modest positive effect that time overruns have on
project performance must be weighted against the much bigger negative cost
effects stemming from unexpected inflation.
Only the introduction of the decomposed cost overrun variables in model 3
improves the regression fit compared with model 1, as shown by the F-test for
additional regressors. But the adjusted coefficient of determination (R2) im-
proves by only one percentage point (from 19 to 20 percent). The chi-square
statistic for the White test (see White 1980) indicates the presence of hetero-
skedasticity at the 1 percent test level.
Model 4. In model 4, which has the transformed dependent and explanatory
variables, the estimated regressions have no heteroskedasricity at the 1 percent
test level. However, the nominal cost and rime overrun parameters are not
statistically significant, and the estimated parameters have the wrong sign.
Model 5. In model 5 the decomposition of nominal cost overruns into unex-
pected inflation and real cost overruns helps somewhat, because the parameter
estimate for the unexpected inflation variable now is statistically significant and
has the expected (positive) sign (faster than expected inflation is a negative
number). An unexpected price increase of 20 percent (the average for the sam-
ple) would thus give rise to a 73 percent discrepancy in the rates of return.
However, although model 5 significantly improves the otherwise poor fit of
model 4, the total explained variance of only 3 percent remains surprisingly low.
Project-specific real cost overruns thus do not seem to affect ex-post rates of
return as adversely as one would expect. This may be due to the possibility that
projects with large real cost overruns (up to almost 400 percent) reflect mostly
expansions of projects, rather than errors in cost estimates. To the extent that
project expansions lead to efficiency gains, one would expect improvements in
the rate of return from such mislabeled "real cost overruns."
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Table 3. Maximum Likelihood Estimates for the Expanded Models
Explanatory variables
and regression statistics
Explanatory variable
Intercept
Appraisal rate of return
Time overrun
Unexpected inflation
Real cost overrun
Unexpected change
in commodity prices
Economic management
rating1
Agarwala price
distortion index*1
Log(GNP)
Adult literacy
Regression statistics
(OLS)
Adjusted R1
F-statistic
Chi-square statistic
(Critical value for
1 percent level)
F-test of the regression
Sample size
Dependent variable
Reestimated economic
Model
3A
0.96
(2.72)°
0.46
(0.03)
0.015
(0.007)
0.19
(0.06)
0.006
(0.01)*
8.19
(2.35)
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
0.214
54.9
63.7'
(37.6)
6.8'
1,015
rate of return
Model
3B
-11.47
(5.77)
0.46
(0.04)
0.01
(0.009)*
0.15
(0.08)
0.003
(0.01)°
9.49
(3.04)
0.42
(0.36)°
n.a.
n.a.
1.84
(0.88)
-0.06
(0.03)
0.23
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
4.5h
612
Model
3C
0.2
(0.001)°
0.47
(0.04)
0.01
(0.009)''
0.16
(0.08)
0.004
(O.Oiy
9.6
(3.0)
n.a.
n.a.
-5.48
(1.40)
2.06
(0.80)
-0.07
(0.03)
0.24
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
7.2*
612
Change in reestimated
economic rate of return
relative to the appraisal
economic rate of return
Model
SA
-160.58
(27.23)
n.a.
n.a.
0.07
(0.08h
3.06
(0.70)
0.09
(0.14)°
118.95
(27.44)
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
0.045
11.9
23.7
(29.1)
14.0*
1,015
Model
SB
-194.05
(65.16)
n.a.
n.a.
-0 .02
(0.10)3
2.78
(0.91)
0.18
(0.17Y
103.58
(34.72)
6.07
(4.25)''
n.a.
n.a.
10.12
(10.30)*
-0.82
(0.34)
0.05
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
4.7i
612
Model
SC
-68.66
(72.54)°
n.a.
n.a.
-0.002
(0.10)°
2.87
(0.90)
0.17
(0.17)'
105.46
(34.24)
n.a.
n.a.
-63.46
(16.54)
15.66
(9-32)
-0.93
(0.33)
0.07
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
7.9'
612
n.a. Not applicable.
NoU: Values in parentheses are the standard errors.
a. Not significant at the 5 percent level.
b. Not significant at the 5 percent level, but significant at the 10 percent level.
c. As of 1978, on a scale of 1 to 10; lowest actual rating is 2.
d. Ranges from 1.14 for Malawi (lowest distortion) to 2.86 for Ghana (highest distortion).
e. Presence of heteroslcedasticity at the 1 percent test level.
f. Regression fit unproved with respect to model 3.
g. Regression fit improved with respect to model 5.
h. Regression fit improved with respect to model 3A, adjusted for sample size,
i. Regression fit improved with respect to model 5A, adjusted for sample size.
Source: Authors'calculations.
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Changes in Primary Commodity Prices
Since about 40 percent of the projects in the sample are agricultural projects,
unexpected changes in commodity prices might explain a substantial part of the
gap in the rates of return. We have chosen the ratio of the Bank's real commodity
price index for 33 primary commodities (excluding energy) at project comple-
tion to the same index at the rime of project appraisal as a measure of the extent
of unexpected commodity price changes during project implementation. This
measure is based on an adaptive expeaarions model of price expeaarions at the
World Bank (see the appendix). Since the Bank's real commodity price index is
deflated by the index of unit value of manufactured exports (MUV) of industrial
countries, collinearity between the unexpeaed commodity price changes vari-
able and the other price variables has been eliminated.
Table 3 gives the results of regressions of models 3 and 5 with this additional
explanatory variable in the columns labeled model 3A and model 5A. The
estimate for the unexpeaed commodity price changes variable is statistically
significant, and its inclusion improves the fit of the regression, as measured by
the F-test, with respea to models 3 and 5. The explained variance {R.2) increases
by about 1.5 percentage points, which is quite respeaable compared to regres-
sions with other variables, but the unexplained variance nevertheless remains
very large.
The unexpected commodity price changes are measured as an index number,
so no change corresponds to the index value of 1.0, and a 10 percent change
corresponds to the index value of 1.1 or 0.9. The parameter estimates imply that
an unexpected decline in commodity prices by 10 percent would reduce the rate
of return by 0.8 percentage points [8.19 X (1.0-0.9)] in model 3A, or 12
percent (118.95 X 0.1) in model 5A. In model 5A the high estimated values of
the intercept term ( — 161) and the commodity price parameter (119) actually
must be set against each other for the zero expeaed price change to give,
approximately, the intercept term from model 5 (—41). The same would hold
true of model 3 A if the intercept estimate was statistically significant.
A similar analysis was carried out for agricultural projeas, using a real agri-
cultural commodity price index, and the results were analogous. The use of
individual commodity price indexes (such as a coffee price index for coffee
projeas) probably would show the greater sensitivity of some types of projeas
to specific commodity price changes, but the number of observations is too small
to permit much further disaggregation. Also many agricultural projeas are
multi-purpose projeas (for example, irrigation) for which the broad commodity
price index may be more useful.
Economic Management Factors
A second set of faaors that could help explain some of the divergence in rate-
of-return estimates between the appraisal and completion of construction are the
country-specific faaors, such as the human resource endowment, the type of
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economic policies pursued by the government, and the efficiency of public ad-
ministration. Of course these are complex factors that are not easily measurable.
We have to make do with a few quantitative indicators, such as adult literacy,
per capita income, an index of price distortions for the 1970s (Agarwala 1983),
and the Bank's internal ranking of the quality of government economic policies
and management (as of 1978, taken as representative for the 1970s).
These factors should have been taken into account by project evaluators and
factored into the appraisal estimate of the rate of return and, more important,
into project design (for example, the extent of project management services
provided by expatriates, which is one way of ensuring the success of the project).
The parameter estimates for these variables thus need to be interpreted as the
degree to which project evaluators did not sufficiently take account of these
factors. In all cases it can be reasonably assumed that project evaluators were
aware of these country-specific factors at the time of appraisal. Only in the case
of the Agarwala price-distortion index could one possibly argue that there is
some benefit of hindsight at work, because the extent of price distortions and
their negative consequences may not have been fully appreciated. But Agar-
wala's index is based mostly on relatively easily available economic data that (at
least in their raw form) were already available at appraisal. Moreover the Bank's
internal rating of economic management performance is fairly closely related to
the price distortion index (the coefficient of correlation between the two ratings
is -0 .67) .
The results of regressions with country-specific variables added (models 3B,
3C, 5B, and 5C) are shown in table 3. The implementation delay and decom-
posed cost-overrun variables from models 3A and 5A have been retained. The
Bank's economic management rating is an explanatory variable in models 3B
and 5B; the Agarwala price distortion index is in models 3C and 5C. Most of the
new variables are statistically significant.
The Agarwala price-distortion index performs statistically considerably better
than the Bank's rating of economic management performance. This is surpris-
ing, since the latter is based on the same economic data plus management's
judgments based on qualitative insights. Apparently the relatively simplistic
procedure of adding up price distortions works better than a careful review
process using qualitative judgments. In all model specifications, replacing the
economic performance rating with the price distortion index results in statis-
tically significant parameter estimates, a higher R.2, and considerably higher
values of F-tests for inclusion of the new regressors. For the actual range of the
price distortion index (from 1.14 to 2.86), the parameter estimates imply a 9.4
[(2.86-1.14) x (-5.48)] percentage points (model 3C) lower RERR in a country
with high price distortions (such as Ghana during the 1970s), compared with a
country with low price distortions (such as Malawi). The adverse effects on
project performance of government interventions through price controls, high
tariffs, import restrictions, and so forth thus have been considerably underesti-
mated in World Bank project appraisals.
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Poor economic management and price distortions explain only about 2 per-
cent of the rate-of-return gap, however, inching the total explained variance
(model 3C) to only 24 percent. The level of income and adult literacy variables
have been introduced as (albeit crude) indicators of the human capital stock, and
their parameter estimates are statistically significant. Thus if per capita income
decreases from $1,000 to $500, ex-post rates of return are lower by about 1.4
percentage points (model 3C), or about 11 percent (model 5C).3 This suggests
that the Bank's project evaluators have tended to overestimate project imple-
mentation capabilities in the poorest countries. Surprisingly, the parameter esti-
mate for the adult literacy variable has the wrong sign, indicating that reesti-
mated rates of return are lower in countries with higher adult literacy rates (for
similar projects and levels of income). This can be explained by the fact that
countries with high rates of literacy tend to engage in projects involving more
sophisticated technology, which brings higher rates of return, but at higher risk,
so that the rate-of-return discrepancy also is greater.
Sectoral and Geographic Differences
There are several ways to analyze the differences between the various types of
projects. One is to introduce dummy (0,1) variables comparing different groups
of projects. Another approach would be to run the same set of regressions on
different sectoral or geographic subsets of projects to see whether there are
statistically significant differences in parameter estimates. Table 4 presents esti-
mates of regressions with both sectoral and regional dummy variables added to
models 3B and 5B, now labeled 3D and 5D, respectively. Although it would
have been preferable to use models 3C and 5C instead of 3B and 5B (because the
Agarwala index performs better), this would have limited the sample to only 31
countries and 612 projects, instead of the entire sample of 1,015 projects.
Agriculture and South Asia were selected as the standard to which other sectors
and regions are compared, so parameter estimates for sectoral and regional
dummy variables indicate how, for example, the energy projects or projects in
the Mediterranean region perform relative to agricultural projects in South Asia.
The explanatory power of both regressions increases considerably after
dummy variables are introduced (from an adjusted ft2 of 0.21 to 0.31 for model
3D and from 0.03 to 0.12 for model 5D). These variables thus contribute more
to the improved regression fit than all the previously introduced variables to-
gether (except for the appraisal rate of return in models 1 to 3). There thus
appear to be dusters of projects with similar characteristics and problems.
Parameter estimates for sectoral dummy variables show that projects in our
data sample fall roughly into two categories. Since the estimates for the intercept
(that is, agriculture), energy, and industry all are insignificant, the results of
model 3D indicate that, other things being equal, projects with an appraisal rate
3. Calculated as 2.06 (In 1,000 - In 500) •= 1.43; and 15.66 (In 1,000 - In 500) =• 10.85,
respectively.
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Table 4. Regressions with Sectoral and Regional Dummy Variables
Explanatory variables
and regression statistics
Explanatory variable
Intercept
Appraisal rate of return
Time overrun
Unexpected inflation
Real cost overrun
Unexpected change in commodity
prices
Economic management rating
Log(CNP)
Adult literacy
Sectoral dummy variable
Energy
Transport
Industry
Urban
Regional dummy variable
East Africa
CFA countries
Other ^(fcst Africa
East Asia
Mediterranean
Latin America
Regression statistics (OLS)
Adjusted R1
F-test of the regression.
Dependent variable
Change in reestimated
economic rate of
return relative to the
Reestimated economic appraisal economic
rate of return
Model 3D
0.45°
0.43
-0.007"
0.12
0.006*
6.45
0.83°
-0.50*
-0.04"
0.96*
7.62
-0.88°
9.51
-12.54
-8.02
-9.92
-3.64
-6.92
-7.11
0.309
13.6=
rate of return
Model SD
-175.15
n.a.
-0.07"
2.55
0.12*
90.49
6.53
11.94°
-0.73
27.41
63.58
-29.51b
-8.55°
-94.82
-52.88
-96.87
-24.24°
-62.33
-63.04
0.121
8.1<<
n.a. Not applicable.
Note: Sample size 1,015 projects for both models.
a. Not significant at the 5 percent level.
b. Not significant at the 5 percent level, but significant at the 10 percent level.
c. Regression fit improved with respect to model 3B.
d. Regression fit improved with respect to model 5B.
Source: Authors'calculations.
of return of, say, 20 percent that are undertaken in these three sectors are
expected to have a RERR of about 9 percent (20 x 0.43), or 11 percentage points
below the estimate. However, transport projects are expected to have a RERR
about 4 percentage points below the estimate (7.62 + [20 x 0.43]), and urban
development projects about 2 percentage points below the estimate (9.51 + [20
x 0.43]). This pattern is roughly confirmed by the results of model 5D, where
the greatest rate-of-return discrepancy is for industry, there is less discrepancy
for agriculture and energy projects, and transport projects again have the lowest
discrepancy in economic rates of return. (Correct interpretation of the figures in
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table 4 is more complicated, though, because we neglected the term <re, [(equa-
tion 2)]; the scale parameter for model 3D is 11.4, and for model 5D it is 113.)
Reestimated rates of return for projects in the transport and urban develop-
ment sectors thus are generally closer to the appraisal rates of return than are
projects in agriculture, energy, and industry. This pattern probably reflects two
factors: the relatively simple technology and organization of transport and ur-
ban development projects compared with industrial and energy projects and the
effect of international markets on industrial and agricultural projects. Projects
producing traded goods seem to be exposed to a higher degree of downside
risks, and this may be related to international competition (that is, competitors
in other countries may be more productive, and this may lead to lower prices for
outputs and sharply lower returns).
Parameter estimates for regional dummy variables all have a negative sign,
implying that reestimated rates of return are highest in South Asia (the standard
of comparison), followed by the projeas in East Asia, with slightly lower (3.6
percent) rates of return. Projects in Latin America, the Mediterranean, and
Francophone Africa (CFA) are next on the list, while projects in East and West
Africa (other than the CFA zone) have performed particularly poorly. The better
performance of CFA members compared with other African countries points to
the importance of the institutional framework and, in particular, the conserva-
tive monetary policies. The project implementation performance in CFA member
countries during the 1960s and 1970s is comparable with the average of devel-
oping countries in the Mediterranean and Latin America.
An analysis of failed projeas indicates that out of 80 total projea failures
(that is, negative rates of return at projea completion), 27 are in East Africa,
with Tanzania alone accounting for 11. Failed projeas are concentrated largely
in agriculture, as nearly two-thirds of all projea failures worldwide have been
agricultural projeas, particularly complex new-style area or rural development
projeas started in the mid-1970s (table 5). Agricultural projeas in Sub-Saharan
Africa have an unacceptable failure rate, with one-half of all projects in East
Africa and more than one quarter of all projeas in West Africa yielding reesti-
mated rates of return below 5 percent. There is a strong distinction in West
Africa between CFA members and other countries.
A more informative approach to the analysis of the regional performance of
projects is to run regressions for each seaor separately (table 6). Compared with
the combined sample (table 4), the disaggregated regressions by seaor have
fewer statistically significant parameters, and parameter estimates for some vari-
ables are very different from seaor to seaor. For the appraisal rate of return, the
parameter estimates are relatively high for infrastructure projects (0.61-0.67)
and low for agricultural and industrial projects (0.21-0.25). Thus downside
risks are larger (or have been underestimated) in the directly productive seaors.
Unexpected movements in primary commodities (excluding energy) seem to
have affected industrial projects even more than agricultural projeas (most of
the industrial projeas in the sample are import-substituting raw materials proj-
eas, such as in the fertilizer industry).
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Table 5. Project Failures by Region and Sector
All projects
East Africa
Ufest Africa
CFA member countries
Other Wtst Africa
Mediterranean
Latin America
South Asia
East Asia
Agricultural projects
East Africa
CFA members
Other \»est Africa
Percentage of projects with reestimated
rates of return below
10 percent
2S.2
41.1
21.8
37.5
29.1
25.1
14.7
12.5
29.0
61.4
34.0
45.8
5 percent
13.6
27.9
18.2
19.6
14.3
10.2
6.4
5.2
19.8
52.9
26.0
33.3
0 percent
7.9
17.1
10.0
16.1
7.4
5.1
1.1
4.2
12.7
37.1
16.0
29.0
Source: Authors' calculations.
Table 6. Regressions by Sector
Explanatory variable
Intercept
Appraisal rate of return
Time overrun
Unexpected inflation
Real cost overrun
Unexpected change in commodity
prices
Economic management rating
Log(GNP)
Adult literacy
Regional dummy variable
East Africa
CFA countries
Other West Africa
East Asia
Mediterranean
Latin America
Regression statistics (OLS)
Adjusted R1
Adjusted R1 without regional
dummies
Sample size
Dependent variable:
Agriculture
6.66-
0.21
-0.02-
0.11"
0.03
11.12
0.61"
0.82-
-0.09
-18.18
-12.64
-17.37
-3.29»>
-6.34
-8.34
0.25
0.11
411
Energy
10.26b
0.61
0.002-
0.29
-0 .02"
1.92>>
1.17
- 1 . 2 1 *
0.03*
- 5 . 0 9
2.91»
- 7 . 8 9
- 4 . 4 2 b
- 7 . 4 6
- 6 . 7 6
0.30
0.29
216
RERR (model 3D)
Transport
7.36*
0.67
- 0 . 0 1 "
0.11*
- 0 . 0 1 "
4.36"
0.52*
0.62="
- 0 . 0 3 *
-12 .83
-10 .38
- 6 . 3 3 b
- 7 . 6 5
-7.38b
-6.97*
0.32
0.29
310
Industry
-15.55"
0.25
-0.02"
-0.05"
-0 .04
15.72
-1 .72
2.35=-
0.10b
-14.06
n.a.
n.a.
5.24b
-4.11-
-2.81-
0.33
0.03
56
a. Not significant at the 5 percent level.
b. Not significant at the 5 percent level, but significant at the 10 percent level.
Source: Authors'calculations.
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Unexpected inflation seems to have affected particularly the more capital-
intensive infrastructure projects but may also reflect delayed adjustments in
government price regulations in the electric power sector, where the Bank's
methodology does not conform to the principles of cost-benefit analysis. The
economic management rating also shows some perplexing sectoral differences,
with a negative parameter estimate for industrial projects, which may be the
consequence of a few conspicuous project failures in countries with high per-
formance ratings. A separate analysis for agricultural projects showed that the
Agarwala price distortion index performs dramatically better than the economic
performance ranking in that sector.
IV. TRENDS OVER TIME
An analysis of appraisal and reestimated rates of return by year of approval
shows that the gap in the rate of return has increased considerably over rime
(figure 2). Projects appraised in the 1960s showed little difference between
average rates of return at appraisal and completion, and annual variations were
tracked quite closely. Appraisal and reestimated rates of return started to diverge
in the early 1970s. The main cause appears to have been the increasing optimism
Figure 2. Rates of Return by Year of Approval, 1961-80
Percent
30
28
Appraisal economic
2g rate of return
24
22
20
Reestimated economic18
rateof return
16 ' ' "% ' ~~
14
12
10
1961 1965 1969 1973 1977 1980
Source: Authors' calculations.
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of projea evaluators, with average appraisal rates of return rising from about 16
percent for projects evaluated in the mid-1960s to 20-25 percent for projects
evaluated in the mid- and late 1970s. By contrast, average rates of return at
projeCT completion showed a persistent downtrend for projects appraised during
1970-76 before recovering again for projects appraised around 1980 (and eval-
uated in 1985-87).
The downtrend in average reestimated rates of return for projects appraised in
the early 1970s was most likely due to external circumstances, that is, the
recession and low commodity prices at the time these projects were completed in
the late 1970s and early 1980s. The increasing rates of return at appraisal
during the 1970s probably reflect internal Bank factors, including the shift in
Bank lending from infrastructure to agriculture and industry. In terms of average
outcomes at projeCT completion, the vastly expanded lending program of the
1970s does not compare too unfavorably. Reestimated rates of return for the
1970s are not very different from those for the 1960s. The sharp increase in
reestimated returns for projects appraised in 1980 must be interpreted with
caution, because it includes only a small percentage of projects of that appraisal
year.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The statistical analysis of rates of return estimates before and after completion
of projeCT construction provides several interesting insights. First, it points to the
large degree of uncertainty surrounding the rate-of-return estimates. Second,
World Bank appraisal estimates of rates of return are biased, that is, too optimis-
tic. If this degree of optimism is shared by other projeCT evaluators, one should
expect that the discount rate that just rations investment projects to the funds
available exceeds the ex-post rate of return by a considerable margin. The
analytical treatment of projeCT risks thus deserves more attention in practice.
Anderson and Quiggin (1990), for example, argue that projeCT implementation
variables usually enter projeCT analysis on a "no surprises" basis, corresponding
to the modal value of the distribution of possible outcomes. Since surprises are
mostly unpleasant, the probability distribution of project implementation out-
comes is skewed (a longer tail in the downside direction). If one were to allow
for the skewed distribution ("bad surprises"), one could correct the bias in the
estimate.
However, factors that have conventionally been associated with this bias (such
as cost overruns and implementation delays) seem to explain only a very small
part of the unexpected changes in projeCT performance (measured by the rate of
return gap). Interestingly, uncertainties seem to be higher in the directly produc-
tive sectors (such as agriculture and industry), where rates of return can be
altered through external market forces or domestic policy shocks. Rate-of-
return estimates seem to be more stable for infrastructure projects.
As an alternative to correcting modal estimates of implementation variables
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for "bad surprises," one could set different minimum rate-of-return criteria for
different types of project (for example, 10 percent for transport, but 15 percent
for agricultural and industrial projects), based on observed divergences in rates
of return.
The analysis also has pointed to the importance of the policy environment for
successful project implementation. The economic management rating and price
distortion variables both indicate that project evaluators did not take the adverse
effects of poor economic policies at the macroeconomic level sufficiently into
account. More puzzling though, is the fact that regional dummy variables also
seem to operate partly as economic management variables and have considera-
bly more explanatory power than direct indicators of the quality of economic
management and institutions.
The fact that projects in CFA member countries seem to perform almost as well
as those in other regions shows that the high failure rate of projects elsewhere in
Sub-Saharan Africa seems to be related primarily to policies and institutions.
However, the better performance of projects in CFA countries during the 1960s
and the 1970s is no guarantee that this will be repeated during the 1980s,
because the external competitiveness of the CFA zone has considerably
deteriorated.
The analysis of observed rate-of-return divergences raises more questions than
it can answer. The high degree of revealed uncertainty also raises the question
whether, and what kind of, improvements in the methodology will contribute to
better investment decisions.
APPENDIX. DERIVATION OF PROJECT DATA IN CONSTANT PRICES
Project cost estimates for World Bank projects are made in current U.S. dol-
lars, since this is the unit of account for the Bank. Appraisal estimates for a
project are made on the basis of prevailing prices at the time of appraisal, a
forecast of price changes for internationally traded capital goods (in terms of
U.S. dollars), and the projected expenditure (disbursement) profile. Project cost
estimates also include a physical contingency for unexpected expenditures. Proj-
ect costs at project completion are, similarly, the sum of annual expenditures in
(actual) current prices ("mixed year dollars").
In periods of unexpectedly high inflation (or for projects with significant
implementation delays) reestimated nominal project costs sometimes are sub-
stantially higher than appraisal estimates, but real project costs may not have
increased at all. To separate nominal from real cost overruns, we derived real
(constant price) cost estimates for each project for both appraisal and project
completion, by deflating yearly project expenditures with the projected and
actual price index for capital goods (the Bank's manufactured unit value (MUV)
index for exports of manufactured goods of industrial countries).
Although forecasts for the MUV index were available for the past 10 years, we
did not have earlier forecasts and had to estimate the price contingency vectors.
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Visual inspection of price forecasts for the past 10 years suggested that the
Bank's price forecasts followed a pattern of "adaptive expectations": projections
seemed to be based on recent price trends. Several adaptive expeaations models
were tested, and we found that the projections were best approximated by a five-
year moving average adaptive expectations model.
The first stage prediction of the MUV index was made by calculating the five-
year moving average:
[MUV,.! + • • • + MUV,_S](A-l) MUV =
The moving average values (MUV') were then used to calculate the average
deviation from the actual value of the index (MUV' — MUV)/MUV, and this
estimate was used as a correction parameter, /3, in the adaptive expectations
model:
(A-2) MUV,* = MUV/_! + 0 (MUV,_ , - MUV;_I) , 0 < 0 < 1.
That is, the forecasting error for the previous period, M U V , , : — MUV,'_I, is
corrected with a fraction /3 (the average error), thereby improving upon ("adap-
ting to") the first-stage forecast.
The real cost at appraisal price projections, p°, is then:
(A-3) X ( p ) E ^
PI
where X" is real cost at appraisal, f is projected duration of project implementa-
tion, c? is nominal cost estimate at appraisal, and pf is projected price vector at
appraisal. The real cost at actual prices is
(A-4) X'(p«)= E ^ f
7-1 Pj
where Xc is real cost based on actual nominal expenditures (cc), actual imple-
mentation duration (**), and actual prices [p*).
The real cost overrun is then [Xc[pc) — X"(pc)]/Xa(p<:), and the unexpected
inflation, as defined in the article is [Xa(p*) - X^p^JJ/X^p"). Unexpectedly
high inflation (p* > p°) is a negative number according to this definition. This is
reflected in the minus sign before the percentage sign in the tables with the
statistical results.
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